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FOREWORD 
If poverty reduction strategies are to genuinely address the various 
dimensions of poverty - including insecurity, vulnerability, gender inequalities 
and access to opportunities, work, assets, and welfare - genuine and 
effective participation of civil society in key decision-making processes 
will need to be institutionalised. This is because the process of tackling 
poverty should be owned, driven and directed by poor people themselves, 
through their governments. 
AFRODAD commissioned five studies into the participation of civil society 
in the processes leading to the preparation of Poverty Reduction Strategies 
(PRSPs) in Uganda, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Mauritania and Mozambique. 
These are the only African countries that had completed PRSPs at the 
end of 2001. The World Bank and IMF insisted on civil society participation 
in the PRSP process as a condition for endorsing the national poverty 
reduction strategy and subsequently releasing debt relief funds. The 
African Governments seem to have adjusted their national Poverty 
Reduction Strategies so they could be acceptable to the World Bank and 
the IMF so as to secure the required Debt Relief from the currently 
unsustainable Debt burden which undermines and violates African people's 
Economic, social, civic and cultural Rights. These, amongst other issues, 
beg the question of how genuine, legitimate, and empowering the process 
of participation and ownership was in these countries. In Uganda, for 
example, although civil society participation in the PRSP process was a 
necessary and meaningful process, it was not sufficient to guarantee 
effective policy change that would secure better living standards of the 
people. 
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1.0. Introduction, Major observat ions and Policy Imperatives 
As are result of the failure of the HIPC Initiative and increasing pressure 
from global south for debt cancellation for the third world countries, the 
World Bank and the IMF introduced the enhanced HIPC (eHIPC) Initiative 
following the Cologne G7 Summit in June 1999. The new Initiative was 
aimed at making debt relief faster, broader and deeper and linked to poverty 
reduction. Within this context, the so-called heavily indebted poor countries 
could become eligible for debt relief on the completion and acceptance of 
their Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The relief would take the 
combined form of debt cancellation and debt rescheduling on bilateral 
debt and debt refinancing of multilateral debt through the HIPC Funds 
established for the purpose. 
The World Bank asserted that the aim of PRSPs was "to strengthen country 
ownership of poverty reduction strategies and to broaden representation 
of civil society - particularly the poor themselves - in the design of such 
strategies; to improve co-ordination among development partners; and to 
focus on the analytical, advisory, and financial resources of the international 
community on achieving results in reducing poverty". 
As at December 2001, eight countries globally that had completed their 
PRSPs. Of these, five are in Africa; partly reflecting the fact that the majority 
of the HIPCs are found in this region. These are Burkina Faso, Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda, which are of interest to this paper. 
AFRODAD commissioned research in the five African countries that had 
completed their PRSPs. The main focus of the research was on civil 
society participation in the process. However, in view of the fact that there 
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We encourage civil society to continue to demand the right to participati 
in national poverty reduction strategies and ensure that their input make' 
a difference in the lives of people. We equally encourage governments t] 
empower civil society and set up institutional structures that will provid( 
them with legitimate space for genuine participation. 
Opa Kapij impanga 
AFRODAD Coordinator. 
was a lingering feeling among African civil society that African Governments 
were in any case already undertaking Poverty reduction strategies it was 
necessary to understand the extent to which these national processes 
had links with the World Bank and IMF led Poverty Reduction Strategies 
Papers. The questions in our minds were: 
- to what extent were the national poverty reduction strategies and 
processes leading to addressing poverty reduction in the various 
countries. 
- Why were the national processes not acceptable to the World 
Bank and the IMF as a basis for providing Debt relief and directing 
resources to already identified areas 
- Was the conditionality of civil society participation going to provide 
additionality to the national processes in terms of the final national 
planning products? 
- What were the particular differences between the national 
processes and the PRSP that was acceptable to the Bank and 
the Fund? 
- To what extent were the PRSPs consistent with the national 
processes and documents, the millennium goals and other 
development frameworks that purported to serve poverty reduction. 
Was there any additionality of PRSPs as a framework? 
- What was to be the specific aspects of PRSPs that the Bank and 
the Fund would be satisfied with and what was the difference 
between this and the usual Structural Adjustment programmes 
(SAPs) that Africa had faced since the 1980s and has become an 
increasingly unacceptable imposition? 
There were more questions than this and we did not even get answers to 
those questions. However, in the following paragraphs and the rest of this 
document we indicate what the research found out in the five countries. 
There were already various plans and Poverty Reduction Strategies in 
the surveyed countries at the time of embarking on PRSPs: the Poverty 
Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) in Uganda, National Poverty Eradication 
Strategy (NPES) in Tanzania, the Piano de Acgao para Redugao da 
pobrezaAbsoluta (PARPA) in Mozambique, a series of National Reference 
Documents (NRDs) encompassing social, economic and other national 
issues in Mauritania, 'Cadre Strategique da Lutte Contra la Pauvrete 
(Poverty Reduction Strategy) in Burkina Faso and also other poverty action 
plans supported by IMF/World Bank such as the global Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). The PRSPs built on the national processes. 
AH the national processes were converted into SAP documents to meet 
World Bank and IMF acceptance. Civil society input was registered but 
did not provide the necessary paradigm shift to make the PRSP nationally 
owned. Among other things the fundamentals of liberalization, including 
the standard (IMF/World Bank) privatization of social services were the 
least denominator in all the PRSPs. 
The PRSP process has very little potential of transforming the partnership 
between African countries and their donor partners and between its 
citizenry. The conversion the content and process of national initiatives, 
such as the NPES, PARPA, PEAP and other development processes into 
the externally imposed PRSPs, undermined local ownership. In each case, 
the national processes had been the basis of the country's PRSP, but 
underwent shifting of focus and approaches to meet the World Bank/IMF 
requirements. This relationship between pre-existing national poverty 
reduction initiatives and the PRSP determines who really dictates the 
development process. Over-reliance on existing plans also raises 
questions about the extent of ownership of the development strategies by 
stakeholders outside the State. Ownership of the development strategies 
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by stakeholders outside the government will depend on the extent of the 
stakeholder participation and the degree to which the final plans reflect 
their concerns and suggestions. Essentially, for the PRSP process to be 
useful, it should transform and help improve the relationship between the 
African state and its citizens and then between the African nations and 
their development partners. Even casual reading of the experiences in 
the five countries would suggest that the PRSP process undermined the 
potential for transformation towards a development paradigm. 
Civil society participation, as an IMF/World Bank condition jeopardises 
the natural democratic relationship that a government and its citizens must 
have. In this light, this paper concludes that the fact that CSO participation 
in the PRSP in the five countries was imposed, the reason for it being 
cosmetic. At the global level, this reflects well-entrenched power relations 
rather than anything that could be called 'participatory'. 
It is also clear that the PRSPs will neither reduce poverty nor provide 
genuine debt relief. The extent to which governments view PRSPs only 
as necessary steps to qualify for debt relief to a large extent determines 
the seriousness with which they draft the documents and even involve 
civil society. There is a danger that by making PRSPs a conditionality for 
debt relief, some countries have ended up focusing on the debt relief rather 
than poverty reduction. In a way, by adopting the World Bank and IMF 
paradigm, there is a trade off between debt relief and poverty reduction. It 
is for this reason that NGOs and even the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (through the Rapportuers on Debt) have 
since 2000 proposed a de-link between PRSPs and Debt relief. As in the 
past, Debt relief has been nothing more than a tool of imposing a 
development paradigm and domination of Debtor countries by the rich 
Creditor countries and their allies. It is hardly expected that there would be 
a major paradigm shift in the way the Creditor countries propose to tackle 
poverty, especially given that the programme still falls under the purview 
of the same institutions - the World Bank and the IMF. 
The following are three useful pol icy observations: 
§ The PRSP is offering an opportunity to redefine the role of 
government, a step that is in tandem with IMF/World Bank policy 
principles that are aimed at limiting government involvement in 
areas where they have a comparative advantage (i.e., the provision 
of public goods). This still remains a big challenge to African 
governments and African people who believe that the state has a 
specific and social role to safeguard the access of all people to 
basic services such as education, health and sanitation which 
privatization undermines. 
§ Given the urgency of Debt cancellation for the poor countries of 
world, and the fact that PRSP would not deliver genuine debt relief, 
there is urgent need to explore other sustainable mechanisms such 
as the call for the establ ishment of a fair and t ransparent 
arbitration (FTA) mechanism on debt which would redress the 
structural problems currently prevailing in the global governance 
system. This would de-link Debt from genuine poverty reduction 
given that the current link distorts attempts to solve both the Debt 
crisis and the poverty problem. 
§ The least that the international financial institutions might do to 
demonstrate their commitment to the principle of civil society 
participation is to pay for increasing the capacity of civil society to 
fully participate by using resources released by Debt cancellation. 
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Equally, given that the governance issue is central to long term 
poverty reduction, resources released from Debt cancellation 
should be directed at enhancing governance in Africa through the 
NEPAD process. 
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1.1. BACKGROUND 
From the early 1980s, the pressure was on almost all African countries to 
adopt International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank prescribed 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) as a way of addressing their 
development problems. Although much of this pressure was coming from 
the Bretton Woods institutions, national governments were also pushed 
in this direction by their bilateral donors who made SAPs conditional to 
development Aid. 
SAP based orientantions began to orient the economies towards the 
liberalised market. There have been casualties of this process at a number 
of levels due to the tendency of markets to strengthen the strong and 
further weaken the already weak economies. Within African countries, 
liberalisation has led to de-industrialisation, individual citizens have had 
reduced access to social services, small producers have lost access to 
markets because of the removal of state commodity marketing boards, 
and governments have been constrained both in terms of their overall 
political direction and their ability to determine particular sectoral policies. 
Globally, African countries have faced a global marketplace in which they 
are by far the weakest players. On the whole, they do not have the 
productive capacity (eroded under SAPs) to make a meaningful dent on 
the world market partly because they have failed to influence the prices of 
what they produce. Neither do these countries have the influence nor power 
(generally perceived as negotiating capacity) required to deal with the 
institutions of the marketplace, particularly the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). 
Many African governments have stated that they were 'wrong' or 'naive' to 
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adopt Structural Adjustment Policies in the first place and the World Bank 
and IMF, themselves, have conceded that the SAP model did not work for 
Africa1. Structural Adjustment has led to a crisis in African countries 
characterised by increasingly divided societies, marginalisation of large 
sections of the population, civil and political unrest and, most dangerously, 
an unsustainable debt burden with the consequent loss of leverage on the 
part the African countries. 
In an attempt to solve both the unsustainable debt burden and the poverty 
problem, the dominant forces in the international arena defined the Pov-
erty Reduction Strategies (PRSPs) Papers to which African countries 
could access Debt relief. We argue broadly that the PRSPs are no differ-
ent from SAPs and that therefore they cannot really be poverty reduction 
strategies. 
1.2. Conceptual Framework of the PRSP 
According to the World Bank and the Fund, 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) describe a 
country's macroeconomic, structural and social policies 
and programs to promote growth and reduce poverty, as 
well as associated external financing needs. PRSPs are 
prepared by governments through a participatory process 
involving civil society and development partners, includ-
ing the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). 
The PRSP was to become the basis for lending programmes by the IMF 
and the World Bank and for HIPC debt relief, replacing the Policy 
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Framework Paper (PFP), which was supposed to be a joint IMF-World 
Bank document outlining a country's policies and reform proposals (World 
Bank, 2001). The PRSP document provides the IMF and World Bank 
with a new platform for jointly assessing a country's loan proposals, the 
emphasis being on how to improve the impact of IMF and WB lending in 
the context of poverty reduction. The six pillars or principles of the PRSP 
are that: 
. it must be developed in a participatory way; i.e. there must be maximum 
consultation of all stakeholders including civil society. It must be 
nationally owned/country-driven as opposed to being donor-driven; 
it must lay out a policy framework and agenda for directly tackling 
poverty; i.e. poverty diagnosis must be thorough - governments should 
understand the nature, magnitude and causes of poverty; 
it must be a comprehensive framework of poverty reduction i.e. there 
must be coherence between poverty goals and the macroeconomic 
framework (poverty targets must be established first and then 
macroeconomic targets set in line with these goals; 
Q it must be a partnership between government, civic society and 
development partners (donors) - governance issues must be 
thoroughly addressed; and 
• it must be a long term intervention in support of poverty alleviation. 
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1.3. Scope of the PRSP 
The (PRSP) is assessed jointly by the Bank and IMF in terms of the 
following scope: 
i. Its objectives; 
ii. Policy content in relation to coherence and sustainability; 
iii. Extent to which governments understand the nature and magnitude 
of the problem of poverty confronting them (how well poverty-
diagnosis has been done); 
iv. Extent to which civil society has been consulted and provided input 
into the PRSP formulation process and its final content, and 
v. Extent to which governance issues are addressed. 
The PRSP document has a positive spin-off for the two Bretton Woods 
Institutions in not only providing common criteria for assessing suitability 
for lending, but grounds for harmonisation of IMF and World Bank policies 
and requirements. 
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0. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Mozambique's government poverty policies and strategies since the late 
1980s have been expressed in the Piano de Acgao para Redugao da 
Pobreza Absoluta (PARPA), Tanzania had adopted a National Poverty 
Eradication Strategy (NPES) in 1997, Uganda had a Poverty Eradication 
Action Plan (PEAP), Burkina Faso had established its priorities under 
'Cadre Strategique da Lutte Contra la Pauvrete, and Mauritania had a series 
of National Reference Documents (NRDs) encompassing social, 
economic and other national issues. 
Despite the emphasis on civil society participation, the PRSP is a 
government led process. Hence, the first step for the five countries was 
to set up, within existing government structures, steering or coordinating 
committees. In Mauritania, this took the form of an Inter-ministerial 
Committee for the Fight Against Poverty, chaired by the Prime Minister 
and a Planning Committee, under the Minister of Economic Affairs and 
Development, responsible for the follow up of the PRSP process. In 
Tanzania, a committee was formed to steer the process comprising twelve 
Ministers and the Governor of the Reserve Bank. Uganda and Mozambique 
began PRSP preparations in the context of government led initiatives that 
were already in progress. 
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2.1. Burkina Faso Process 
All members of government in Burkina Faso were already well aware of 
the importance of focusing every strategy on the reduction of poverty. In 
order to begin the PRSP process, an interministerial committee was 
formed involving research and planning experts. This committee prepared 
a draft PRSP. This draft was first presented to: 
1. The two chambers of Parliament (as the representatives of the 
people) and to the governmental Economic and Social Council; 
2. Development partners in two meetings, the first of which was also 
open to MPs; 
3. Civil society in two workshops, held in regional centres, at which 
they had an opportunity to discuss the draft with the Drafting 
Committee. 
Members of the Drafting Committee attended all the meetings and 
workshops to ensure that the contributions made were incorporated into 
the final draft of the PRSP. 
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2.2. Mauritania Process 
The National Reference Documents (NRDs) are broad in scope though 
and not necessarily based on extensive research. The PRSP is perceived 
as having taken over the role of the NRDs, on the basis of an analysis of 
the poverty situation in Mauritania that had never been undertaken before. 
Unusually, the PRSP in Mauritania was launched with an awareness 
campaign, thus opening the process up to stakeholders who might not 
have known about it otherwise and enabling them to take a proactive role 
in ensuring they were involved. 
Like the case for Mozambique, an Interministerial Committee led the PRSP 
process in Mauritania. It was coordinated by the Minister of Economic 
Affairs and Development and the Human Rights Commission, with 
support, at the technical level, from technical representatives of 
government ministries and twelve Technical Theme Groups. The Theme 
Groups included civil society and donor representation. In addition, a Donor 
Committee was set up. 
The PRSP then went through the following process: 
• Four inter-regional seminars (encompassing the thirteen districts in 
the country) which involved elected representatives of NGOs and 
other civil society organisations as well as other development 
partners; 
• A meeting between members of the General Assembly, MPs, Mayors, 
NGOs, trade unions, development partners and individuals 
recognised for their involvement in poverty alleviation; 
• A further series of inter-regional seminars; and 
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Submission to Parliament for approval. 
Mauritania has also undertaken the first evaluation of its PRSP, which 
became the subject of further inter-regional seminars. 
2.3. Mozambique Process 
Delivered in 1999, the PARPA was a plan of action developed out of a 
national household survey of living conditions (1996/7) and a poverty 
assessment (1999). It also drew on a number of earlier projects and 
initiatives, namely the Social Dimensions of Adjustment project (1989), 
the Office for the Support of Vulnerable Population Groups (1990), the 
Economic and Social Rehabilitation Programme and Poverty Alleviation 
Strategy (1990) and the Strategy for Poverty Reduction in Mozambique 
(1995). 
The process of developing PARPA was a partially participatory one, with 
sectoral consultations being held. These reached community level to a 
greater or lesser degree, depending on the nature of the particular sector, 
so that the policies of the education and health sectors were based more 
soundly on user community input than those in more technical or nationally 
oriented sectors, such as public works. 
PARPA's completion coincided with the introduction of the PRSP initiative 
and, hence, Mozambique's PARPA was accepted by the World Bank as 
the country's Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IPRSP). A major 
concern was to retain coherence with existing policy instruments such as 
the Food Security and Nutrition Strategy and the HIV/AIDS Strategy Plan. 
Mozambique's PRSP process, therefore, was grounded in the substantial 
research and poverty assessment that had formed the basis of PARPA, 
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a s well as the experience gained from the implementation of a number of 
poverty reduction strategies throughout the 1990s. 
However, the move from an I PRSP, which equated to the national poverty 
reduction initiative, to Mozambique's final PRSP called for a further process 
of revision and consultation. The consultations involved representatives 
of civil society, international partners and provincial government. As their 
point of departure in the analysis, provincial poverty profiles, human 
development profiles and the original PARPA document were used. The 
results of these consultations were collated and discussed at a national 
seminar whose outcome fed into the development of provincial plans of 
action. Discussions also began at this stage on the monitoring and 
evaluation aspects of the programme. A Technical Consultation Unit was 
formed within the Ministry of Planning and Finance to conduct and report 
on the final round of consultations. These were narrower in scale, taking 
place among 'invited partners' and aimed at harmonising the PARPA/PRSP 
vision, priorities and targets. They also covered social and economic policy 
implications, flow of information, issues of governance and the legal 
framework for the initiative. 
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2.4. Tanzania Process 
For Tanzania, a poverty eradication policy was already in place while the 
PRSP represented a medium term strategy (2001-4) for the 
implementation of the policy. The NPES is one of the many documents 
developed under Tanzania's development Vision 2025, along with the 
Tanzania Assistance Strategy, the National External Debt Strategy, and 
the Public Health and Expenditure Review. The NPES is the document 
that focuses on poverty eradication. It was adopted in 1997 and has been 
the subject of annual and multi-year public expenditure reviews 
The overall process of preparing the PRSP in Tanzania was coordinated 
by the Vice President's office. As well as the Steering Committee, a 
Technical Committee was formed, comprising officials from the Vice 
President's and Prime Minister's offices, the Planning Commission, the 
Bank of Tanzania, and the Ministries of Finance, Education, Health, Works, 
Community Development, Local Government, Agriculture, Water, Energy 
and Minerals, and Youth Development. It was coordinated by the Ministry 
of Finance and was given the specific task of preparing both the interim 
and final PRSP documents and organising national and zonal workshops. 
Having prepared an IPRSP, the Technical Committee presented it at a 
consultative technical meeting to government, donor and civil society 
representatives. 
Once the IPRSP was approved by Cabinet, work began on the drafting of 
the final PRSP with a series of zonal workshops aimed at soliciting views 
from grassroots stakeholders. Within each of the seven specified zones, 
every district was represented by four villagers, one District Councillor, 
one Town Councillor and one District Executive Director. Civil society 
representation was through five NGO representatives in each zone. An 
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outside expert was used by the Technical Committee to assist in preparing 
a reference document, which outlined workshop objectives, discussion 
guidelines and methodology Some participatory methodologies, such as 
disaggregating discussion groups by gender, were used in the zonal 
workshops. 
The reports of the zonal workshops were returned to the Technical 
Committee, which drew on them in the formulation of the initial draft of the 
PRSP. Other background papers, such as the Vision 2025, the Tanzania 
Assistance Strategy, the NPES (1997), the National External Debt Strategy 
and the Public Expenditure Review, as well as a number of sector specific 
studies, were used as background to the PRSP. The draft then went through 
the following process: 
1 A consultative meeting with the donor community, including a joint 
IMF/World Bank mission; 
2 Briefing of and consultation with MPs; 
3 A national workshop of 25 participants including Permanent 
Secretar ies, Regional Commiss ioners , representat ives of 
multilateral and bilateral donors, private sector representatives, 
media and representatives of NGOs; and 
4 A retreat workshop for Regional Administrative Secretaries (who 
would be responsible for implementation). 
At the end of this process, the final draft of the PRSP was presented to 
and approved by Cabinet. 
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2.5. Uganda Process 
The PEAP is a government framework for poverty eradication, developed 
in 1997 after two years of consultations with civil society organisations, 
among other stakeholders. CSOs lobbied successfully to be included in 
the Drafting Committee of the PEAP. They gathered inputs from their 
constituents, analysed it and presented their analysis to the Technical 
Committee of the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic 
Development that was responsible for developing the PEAP. The 
involvement of civil society in the formulation of the PEAP appears to have 
been a determining factor in the World Bank decision to accept this 
document as Uganda's PRSP. However, as in the case of Mozambique, 
some further consultation work was required to turn the PEAP document 
into a fully-fledged PRSP, although this work had already been envisaged 
as a necessary update of the PEAP. 
What distinguishes the formulation of Uganda's PRSP from the PEAP is 
the very short time frame in which it took place. This was a result of external 
pressure arising from the international perception that the HIPC initiative 
was not working and that few countries had benefited from it. Uganda, 
therefore, was needed as a showpiece by donors and had to get its PRSP 
finished within a period of less than six months. The task was led by a 
Technical Committee within the Ministry of Finance, Planning and 
Economic Development; a government initiated Steering Committee 
comprising senior government officials, donor representatives, research 
institutions and civil society organisations, and a Civil Society Task Force. 
The process include^ 
A consultative workshop attended by all stakeholders and discussion 
groups formed within the context of this workshop; 
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A special workshop to introduce the PEAP/PRSP process to MPs; 
A series of consultation workshops with local government officials, 
run in parallel with consultations with grassroots groups that were 
run by civil society organisations; and 
Consultative Group meetings held in the capital. 
was supplemented by research input from the Uganda Participatory 
overty Assessment Project (UPPAP) of the Ministry of Finance, Planning 
nd Economic Development, The Economic Policy Research Centre 
EPRC) and the Makerere Institute of Social Research (MISR). Government 
Iso hired an international consultant to synthesise the information and 
isues and incorporate them into the PEAP/PRSP document. 
i d 
3.0. DEFINITION OF PRSPS IN PRACTICE 
From the experience of the five countries, the PRSP basically means a 
document that identifies priorities for government. In Burkina Faso, the 
PRSP is a "document that sets priorities" (Burkina Faso PRSP Document, 
section 1.3). It is a document that does not seek to replace sectoral 
strategies that already exist but provides a framework for aligning these 
with government priorities. It is also: 
a development Strategy that will focus on enhancing the impact of 
public policies and on the need to increase purchasing power of the 
disadvantaged population and create an environment more conducive 
to their social development; 
a new development paradigm that addresses sustainability in the face 
of external shocks and one that is fuelled by a broader economic base 
(includes rather than crowds out the poor who are the majority of the 
population); and 
a new focus on equity. 
i 
Its purpose is to influence the sectoral objectives of each line ministry and 
the choice of monitoring indicators for the programmes and action plans 
to be financed. The PRSP ensures that poverty reduction is the focus of 
development strategies and thus monitoring indicators are developed to 
measure the impact of these in relation to poverty (i.e., poverty-centred 
monitoring and evaluation). 
In Uganda, the PRSP is the country's Poverty Eradication Action Plan. It 
is a national planning framework to guide detailed medium term sector 
plans, district plans, and the budget process. 
2 0 
In Mozambique, the PRSP is the country's Action Plan for the Reduction 
of Absolute Poverty (PARPA). The document explains the strategic vision 
for reducing poverty that will guide the preparation of the country's annual 
and medium-term budgets, programmes and policies. The PRSP, which 
is based on Government plans, is a rolling and dynamic programming 
instrument that will incorporate new elements arising from changes in 
society and the economy. The key objective - the reduction of absolute 
poverty - will not be altered, but the tools, policies and targets may change 
as the country's knowledge of the different variables improves. 
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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY PRSPS - SIMILARITIES 
AND DIFFERENCES 
3.1.SIMILARITIES 
Although the five PRSPs were drawn up independently of each other, they 
bear resemblance to each other in terms of the priority areas set for poverty 
reduction. 
3.2.1. Convert ing PRS into PRSP 
In each case, the national processes became the basis of the country's 
PRSP, shifting focus and changing methodologies to meet the World Bank/ 
IMF requirements. The relationship between pre-existing national poverty 
reduction initiatives and the PRSP process is crucial in determining who 
really owns the development process in each of the countries and whether 
the PRSP is meant for poverty reduction or debt relief. 
All the five PRSPs are conditionality for accessing debt relief under the 
HIPC initiative. Burkina Faso's PRSP, like many others, acknowledge that 
the PRSP documents were prepared in the context of the enhanced HIPC 
initiative. While the process was participatory, qualifying for debt 
cancellation should have been a key objective in itself in all the country 
PRSPs. Without the endorsement of the IMF and World Bank, 
governments are unlikely to qualify for debt relief and unlikely to get bilateral 
funding too. Thus, it is questionable to what extent a programme can be 
truly government or nationally owned. It is more appropriate to say that 
the process is government led. 
Uganda's Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), with modifications to 
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suit the specifications of the World Bank and the IMF, now serves as its 
pRSP. The PEAP was drafted through participatory processes involving 
civil society and the poor themselves. Several other policy initiatives 
^formed the debate on Uganda's PRSP. These include the Vision 2025, 
which described the country's broad national aspirations, and the first 
poverty Eradication Action Plan of 1997, which now forms the basis for 
the PRSP. 
Although it has been argued that the major input that was required to make 
Uganda's PEAP compatible with other PRSPs was civil society participation 
and the time frame factor, the issue goes much deeper into the ideology 
informing the document, without conforming to which the document would 
have been rejected by the Bank and the IMF. If the PEAP had been 
accepted without much change, then one can only assume that it complied 
with the requirements of the IMF and the World Bank. It had to be modified; 
again raising the question of the extent to which the programme could be 
truly government or nationally owned. 
While the vision 2025 in Tanzania and Uganda had both been drawn up in 
a consultative process with civil society, they lacked precise details of 
how the countries were to achieve the vision, leaving this to other planning 
processes. The Poverty Eradication Strategies in both countries had civil 
society input, which was however not broad enough as compared to the 
participation in the process of drafting the PRSPs. Thus at one level, the 
PRSP processes deepened the CSO participation or involvement. In spite 
of this however, it remains unclear if such participation improved the 
national process and content or just justified the participation aspect of 
the final PRSP. 
Tanzania viewed its PRSP essentially as "an integral part of ongoing 
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macroeconomic and structural reforms". In essence, Tanzania's PRSp 
like many others, form part of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), 
The government of Tanzania has only chosen to "accelerate selected 
reforms likely to have a major impact on poverty reduction". In his budget 
speech for the year 2000/01, Tanzania's then Finance Minister, Daniel 
Yona, explained to parliament that Tanzania expected debt relief of about 
US$2 billion from the World Bank, IMF and the Paris Club. He however 
warned the house that there were conditions to the relief: "Firstly we must 
continue implementing sound macroeconomic policies, and good 
governance. Second, we must prepare a PRSP with participation of civil 
society. Third, while preparing the PRSP, we are required to complete 
certain activities..." 
The Minister's remarks give the lie to the internal ownership of the PRSP 
process and also calls into question Tanzania's commitment to poverty 
reduction. From his speech, it is clear that the government is trying to 
follow the instructions given by the donors and that its main concern is to 
secure the debt relief. However the government realised that it could only 
qualify for relief by fulfilling the conditions laid down by the donors. 
Consultation with civil society then becomes just another condition that 
has to be fulfilled rather than a necessary step in the drawing up of a 
comprehensive, home grown poverty reduction strategy. From the 
minister's remarks one can safely say that the government would be willing 
to work with anyone prepared to help it meet the conditions laid out as 
quickly as possible (and the Bank and the IMF are always willing to assist). 
This has strong implications for the content and ownership of the 
programmes in all the three countries. 
Whilst national poverty reduction strategies have been an essential building 
block for PRSPs, the PRSP document is significantly different from past 
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poverty reduction strategies (PRS). PRS are mechanisms for reducing 
poverty, drawn and implemented by the national governments while the 
pRSP is a policy document that aligns sectoral policies with government 
central objective of poverty reduction. It has become the focal point of 
government planning at both central and sectoral level. 
Uganda's well developed poverty reduction action plan (PEAP) has been 
adopted as the country's PRSP on the basis of its emphasis on four 
essential points: 
i. increasing the ability of the poor to raise their incomes; 
ii. provid ing a f ramework for economic growth and 
transformation so as to accommodate the poor in 
economic activity and growth; 
iii. increasing the quality of life of the poor; and 
iv. ensuring good governance and security such that gains in 
poverty reduction can be sustained in the long term. 
The PEAP has been comprehensive and has benefited from the experience 
and progress made since its inception in 1997. The formulation process 
benefited from participatory research (ensuring consultation and 
ownership), a thorough grasp of poverty issues (Poverty Status Report) 
and the realignment of the budget to ensure a sustainable pro-poverty 
strategy. In adopting the PEAP as the PRSP document, revisions were 
necessary. The preparation of the revised PEAP document was a highly 
participatory process and remains iterative. This participatory approach, 
based on a Participatory Action Plan and effective feedback mechanisms 
to ensure that all stakeholders (government, donors, local government, 
civil society and parliamentarians) contribute to the process has been 
essential for building partnerships, a pillar of PRSPs. Statistical surveys, 
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which form the basis of such type of planning, were reinforced with more 
participatory poverty assessment methods in order to bring in the voice of 
the poor. 
Mozambique's PARPA has also been adopted as the country's PRSP. 
Mozambique 's PARPA has been adopted on the basis of 
comprehensiveness and its long-term development perspective. Poverty 
reduction is to be achieved through a coherent growth with equity strategy. 
Attention is equally placed on economic development as it is on distributing 
the gains of growth to the poor. The poor are recognised as an important 
economic power base and hence adequate priority is placed on agriculture 
from where the majority of these derive their livelihood. The similarity 
between the PRSP and PARPA is in the common emphasis on education 
and health as a means of not only achieving social protection but investment 
in improving the human resources from this segment of the population. 
The Mozambique PRSP clearly specifies that poverty reduction, a goal 
that has remained elusive since independence in 1970s, is the key 
objective and will remain such in the medium term - only the tools and 
means of achieving this will change. The PRSP for Burkina Faso stresses 
equity - that is, making sure that the poor benefit from growth. Uganda's 
PRSP is more specific about its objective of reducing absolute poverty 
(by reducing headcount of income poverty to 10%). 
Both Mozambique and Burkina Faso refer to the empowerment of the 
poor as a strategic objective. The PRSPs seek to build the capacity of 
the poor so that they can participate in growth and benefit there from through 
increased incomes. The countries realise that the poor are an important 
segment of the countries' national human resource and as such should 
be harnessed and improved to have broad-based economic growth. 
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3.2.2. PRSP for Social Sector Development 
The implicit expectation of the World Bank and IMF in relation to policy 
content is that PRSPs will not challenge programme content (i.e., the 
reform agenda of the two institutions). The PRSPs are not expected to 
lead to radically different programmes being formulated, but that increased 
attention will be paid to social sectors and participation promoted by the 
PRSP process. It will simply give civic society a better understanding of 
why "IMF-style" reforms are necessary and thus ownership of them. It is 
not surprising therefore that both Burkina Faso and Uganda maintain that 
economic growth and the opening of the economy, as a means of achieving 
it, remain important elements of a pragmatic strategy for poverty alleviation. 
A key feature of the policy direction pursued in the five PRSPs is the 
prioritisation of social services, agriculture and rural infrastructure as a 
means of attacking poverty at the root. All countries realise that most of 
the poor people are in rural areas. Improving social services, agriculture 
and rural infrastructure are the pillars of poverty alleviation. 
The new focus on social sectors is contained in all five PRSPs. Education 
and health are to receive greater attention in contrast with classical IMF/ 
World Bank policies that have sought to shift resources from non-
productive social services to more productive economic activities. 
However, they are all advocating for targeted forms of support to these 
sectors but the question to be answered is whether the perceived benefits 
of targeting can offset the associated costs and pressures from the 
financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. Strong social sector 
support is envisaged in health, education and water development and the 
goal is to improve the quality of life of the poor would have to articulate the 
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l iberal isation of social services which is part of Aid and Trade 
conditionaslities as shown in the case of Ghana. 
In all countries, the PRSP is advocating for increasing support to 
agriculture. In Uganda, the PRSP is advocating for the modernisation of 
agriculture and rural infrastructure development (feeder roads), designed 
to offer employment opportunities for the rural poor. The use of labour 
intensive methods of road construction and rehabilitation is also being 
proposed. 
There is also renewed emphasis on promoting other sectors of the 
economy such as energy, the goal being to increase access of the poor 
to energy sources. An emerging policy thrust is noticeable in the promotion 
of small to medium scale enterprises (SMEs) and provision of special 
incentives to women. In Uganda, a critical element of the strategy for 
economic growth is the removal of constraints on private sector 
competitiveness, which lead to increased investment opportunities, growth 
and trickle down benefits. 
For Burkina Faso, the PRSP seeks to transform agriculture in a manner 
that improves the security of agricultural incomes - that is, reduces 
vulnerability of agricultural incomes to external shocks. 
In Mozambique, the principal objective of agricultural and rural development 
is to increase income-generating opportunities, especially for the family 
sector. Specific interventions consist of actions to develop technologies, 
human capital and infrastructure. Improvement of the road network will 
permit better access to markets, and will facilitate communication and 
mobility, especially for those in rural areas and depend on agriculture. 
2 8 
3.2.3. Market Liberalisation 
In the PRSPs of all the five countries, nowhere in their drive for export-led 
growth is the issue of increased access to markets in the developed 
countries and better terms of trade for their products raised as an issue. 
Rather the deteriorating terms of trade for primary products like coffee 
are taken as a given situation that should be factored into planning, while 
the protectionism of northern countries to exports of interest to developing 
countries is not even mentioned. On the other hand, studies have shown 
that Africa's loss from terms of trade alone is higher than the total aid it is 
receiving from developed countries. Perhaps focusing on this issue alone 
would benefit the region more in the long term than the debt forgiveness 
under HIPC. 
In looking at agricultural development, the Burkina Faso PRSP focuses 
first on agricultural exports as "the main engine of growth over the medium 
term". Although it is crucial to prioritise agricultural exports, given Burkina 
Faso's level of poverty and the findings of studies carried out in the country 
showing that poverty is concentrated among food crop farmers. Thus, 
urging the government to pay even greater attention to the improvement 
of the lives of food farmers to ensure food security is absurd, to say the 
least. 
The focus on agricultural exports or even cash crops should be gender 
sensitive. Studies have shown that women benefit least from diversification 
into cash crops, both at the household level and within national economies. 
An emphasis on food security, on the other hand, has more positive spin-
offs for poor households in terms of improved nutritional levels and even 
reduced workloads for women. However, none of the five PRSPs takes a 
gender perspective of the issue. 
35 
The five country PRSPs review that in the agriculture sector, the 
government will "continue to disengage itself from production and marketing 
activities" and leave these activities to the private sector. This is a 
hackneyed approach that is both untrue, in relation to the developed 
countries themselves and a recipe for poverty in developing countries. 
Leaving marketing functions to the private sector assumes that the 
markets are efficient and that they will be able to provide the services the 
people need at affordable prices and pay them fair prices for their produce, 
which would help reduce poverty. 
But the reality on the ground as explained in this study is different. The 
section of the document dealing with the determinants of poverty explains 
the marketing problems Burkina Faso faces: "Fluctuations in prices -
which can double between harvest time and lean food supply periods and 
even from one region to another - prove just how imperfect the markets 
are. Low prices at harvest time, which then rise during the growing season 
severely, penalise poor farmers and aggravate poverty. The poor are often 
forced to sell their food crops at harvest time to meet urgent needs, only 
to find it necessary to repurchase the same items six to nine months later 
in order to compensate for their food deficit". 
Another market-related problem is that there is no link between the 
productive western part of Burkina Faso and the Sahel, where agricultural 
productivity is low. The document explains that the price variations are 
due to high transaction costs, because markets are "buyers" markets 
with the result that prices received by producers differ considerably from 
those paid by consumers. 
Given such market conditions, the government has a responsibility to 
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intervene to correct the price distortions and the exploitation of peasant 
farmers by merchants who take advantage of the people's poverty to buy 
their produce at low prices at harvest time and sell at exorbitant prices 
during lean times. The poor infrastructure, in particular roads, discourages 
competition among buyers, which works to the disadvantage of the poor. 
Also the lack of a pan-territorial price for the agricultural commodities in 
the liberalised market means that not only do the farmers get lower prices 
for their produce, but they pay more when they want to repurchase the 
same grains a few months later. Government intervention in the sector 
would ensure that there is a smaller difference in the price paid to the 
farmers and the price at which they repurchase their grain during the lean 
period. 
The PRSP document admits that there is no efficient link between the 
productive western parts of the country and the drier Sahel areas where 
productivity is low. This problem is directly linked to poor transport 
infrastructure (and perhaps long distances) and will not be corrected by 
the government taking a back seat and leaving everything to the market. If 
marketing of essential food is left to the private sector people in the Sahel 
will continue pay punitive prices that take based on the higher expenses 
and risks the traders confront in delivering food to the areas. Until the 
transport network is good and the costs of transporting the goods is 
reduced, the need for the government to intervene in the markets to ensure 
food security and access to cheaper food for the poor will remain. 
The PRSP also argues that Burkina Faso faces higher factor costs 
compared to other countries in the region. The factors in question include 
transportation, telecommunications, water and energy. The government 
attributes high costs to "Monopoly-based market structures and the tax 
system" and says this can be corrected through privatisation and trade 
liberalisation. But apart from road transport and telecommunications 
(private haulers as against railways and cellular phones), it will be difficult 
to create competition among private investors in the provision of water 
and energy. Because of the infrastructure requirements, consumers linked 
to one energy or water supplier cannot switch overnight to a more 
competitive one. Privatisation will therefore mean giving private companies, 
which have no social obligations to the people, the monopoly. While 
services by private providers might be more efficient, they are likely to be 
more expensive and therefore not affordable to the poor. 
3.2.4. Growth wi th Equity 
Closely linked to redistribution is the issue of equity. The PEAP tried to 
address this in the distribution of resources to the different regions by 
using a formula where 85 percent of the resources are allocated according 
to the size of the district population and 15 percent according to the 
geographical area. However it has been found that while poverty levels in 
the rest of the country fell between 1997 and 2000, they increased in the 
poorer Northern Region from 60 to 66 percent. This clearly showed the 
need to distribute resources using a more poverty equitable and sensitive 
formula. Under a proposed formula the poverty status of a district would 
be given a 20 percent weighting while the weights for geographical area 
and population size would be reduced. 
In all five countries, the private sector is seen as the engine of growth, 
which should be nurtured. Burkina Faso's PRSP, for instance, says "the 
government has adopted a strategy to make the private sector the engine 
of growth". To this end, it will implement major structural reforms "to more 
fully open up the economy to the outside". Among the measures it will 
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introduce will be "implementing of a more incentive-oriented tax policy 
aimed at sharpening the country's competitive advantage by reducing the 
tax burden on economic operators in the formal economy". 
It is a well-known fact that in most African countries, the tax base is very 
narrow because of the predominance of the informal sector, which 
operates outside the tax system. Governments therefore require all the 
tax resources they can muster to finance development. Unless if the level 
of taxation was very high, the reduction of taxes on companies in the 
formal sector is therefore not likely to serve the purpose of poverty 
reduction. Experience with tax incentives, particularly for foreign 
manufacturing companies, is that they often relocate to a new tax haven 
at the end of their tax holiday. In the meantime, they would have been 
subsidised by the local poor and denied the government revenues, which 
would otherwise have been used to reduce poverty. Rather than focus on 
tax incentives, governments should improve infrastructure and the services 
provided to private enterprises. 
Also when the private sector is allowed to operate essential services (or 
public goods) such as water and energy there will be need to establish a 
regulatory framework run by an efficient, transparent and technically 
competent authority to ensure that the companies do not take advantage 
of their monopoly position to exploit the people. But given the capacity 
constraints faced by many African governments, it might be difficult to 
establish such bodies or even to design the policies and regulations. 
The decision to privatise essential services such as energy and water 
should therefore be considered carefully, especially where poverty 
reduction is considered a priority and in countries where the majority of 
the people are already failing to pay or have no access to the services. 
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For instance, privatisation of the telecommunications sector may result in 
the neglect of the rural areas where the lower demand is considered 
uneconomical resulting in higher unit costs. In energy, it would also work 
against rural electrification programmes, which in most cases are designed 
to stimulate development in the neglected rural areas rather than make 
profit for the service providers. 
3.2.5 Access to land 
The PEAP acknowledges that there are deficiencies in the process of 
land tenure in Uganda and that the institutions of inheritance and ownership 
currently discriminate against some groups, in particular women who in 
parts of the country have no right to own land. The PEAP suggests the 
enactment of a land law to protect the land rights of vulnerable groups, 
including widows, divorced women and orphans as well as to provide 
them with free legal advice in land disputes. 
Given the importance of access to land in poverty reduction, the government 
should move quickly to put in place mechanisms to ensure greater access 
for disadvantaged groups. According to the 2002 Government Progress 
Report however, land conflicts remain high in Uganda with 52 percent of 
the communities in parts of the country reporting land conflicts. Resolving 
them is however difficult as the Land Registry is perceived by the public 
as "the most corrupt institution in the justice system". This does not augur 
well for enhancing equity in land distribution. In comparison, the Companies 
Registry, which registers new companies and provides them information, 
is considered to be providing "accurate, professional and speedy service". 
This clearly shows a bias towards the private sector and failure to prioritise 
actions that have a strong impact the majority poor. 
3 4 
3.2.6. Effectiveness and Sustainabll l ty 
In all the five country PRSPs, there is an outline, among other things, of 
how resources saved from debt relief will be spent. The issue of 
effectiveness is exhaustively covered in the five countries. The general 
thrust is to identify the most direct way of tackling poverty, redefining the 
role of the state, and increasing the involvement of NGOs and civic society 
where they have a comparative advantage in delivering the Strategy. In 
some cases, the PRSP provides for capacity building to strengthen 
capacities of implementing agencies. The PRSPs are laased on a thorough 
poverty diagnosis and are specifically designed to cater for the needs of 
different categories of the poor. The general emphasis is on tackling 
rural poverty through rural development and direct interventions to improve 
the quality of rural life. This characteristic makes these strategies relevant 
to the needs of the intended beneficiaries. 
Apart from the issue of effectiveness, the issue of sustainability is another 
extensively covered. Most of the discussion of sustainability issues relates 
to the promotion of the sustainable use of natural resources by the poor, 
e.g., land and water. In the case of Burkina Faso's PRSP, the focus is on 
reducing pressure that demographic growth and poverty place on natural 
resources. These natural resources often constitute the main assets of 
the poor. Natural resource management is meant to promote the 
sustainability of development actions. The poverty alleviation strategy is 
based on the search for a balance between the needs of the population 
and sustainable management of available resources. 
• 
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3.2.7. Governance 
In addition to requiring a coherent policy strategy for poverty reduction, the 
World Bank and IMF Boards are also concerned with the extent to which 
governments have consulted with civil society and how governance issues 
will be addressed within the PRSPs. All countries reviewed have placed 
considerable attention to the issue of governance. Burkina Faso pledges 
to promote good governance to release resources usually diverted by 
corruption. Mozambique acknowledges that good governance is a 
fundamental condition for success of the poverty reduction strategy. The 
country's PRSP stresses that the quality of state institutions is very 
important for the provision of public services benefiting the poor. Uganda's 
PRSP notes that political insecurity is among the most pressing needs of 
the poor. Hence, the resolut ion of conf l icts, democrat isat ion, 
decentralisation and increasing people's control over their own lives and 
the policies and services, which affect them, are priority actions for Uganda. 
Accountability and transparency, the key language of donors, is strongly 
enforced in the five PRSPs. However, the question remains whether these 
have been a result of a good consultative process or merely statements 
to fulfil implicit aid conditionality. 
An analysis of the PRSP process in three countries2 (Mozambique, Uganda 
ad Tanzania) cites corruption in Mozambique as a possible reason that 
the PRSP might fail. Government corruption is also given as the reason 
for delays in disbursement of donor funds in Uganda under the 'basket' 
system requested by CSOs. The latter case suggests that civil society in 
Uganda does not perceive corruption to be such a threat to their welfare 
as those from outside do. In the final analysis it is a government's 
accountability to its own people that is of primary importance. 
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With the exception of Uganda, which does enjoy a no-party democracy, 
both Mauritania and Burkina Faso focus on their multi-party democracies, 
regularity and fairness of elections as signs of good governance. While 
this is a great achievement, there is need to broaden the concept of 
democracy beyond regular elections. In consultations with civil society at 
grassroots level, Ugandan raised concern at their lack of access to the 
justice system as a major issue. There is therefore a need to broaden 
governance to include the access of the poor to justice, especially on 
issues affecting their access to assets such as land. 
3.2.8. Priority Areas of intervention 
The table below itemises the priority areas for action identified in each of 
the five countries. 
Table. 1.0 
Mauritania Mozambique Uganda Tanzania Burkina Faso 
Primary 
education 
Primary 
education 
Primary 
education 
Primary 
education 
Primary 
education 
Health care Health Health Health Health 
Water and 
Sanitation 
Water and 
Sanitation 
Water and 
Sanitation 
Water and 
Sanitation 
Water and 
Sanitation 
Macroeconomic 
stability 
Macroeconomic 
stability 
Macroeconomic 
stability 
Macroeconomic 
stability 
Macroeconomic 
stability 
Essential 
Health 
package 
Mimimum 
Health 
package 
Minimum 
Health 
package 
Essential 
Health 
package 
Health 
Care 
package 
- Rural roads Rural roads Rural roads Rural roads 
Good 
governance 
and security 
Good 
governance 
and security 
Good 
governance 
and security 
Good 
governance 
Good 
governance 
Combating 
corruption 
- Combating 
corruption 
Combating 
corruption 
Combating 
corruption 
Judiciary 
reform 
Judiciary 
reform 
Judiciary 
reform 
Judiciary 
reform 
Judiciary 
reform 
Privatisation Privatisation Privatisation Privatisation Privatisation 
Reduce 
regional 
disparities 
Reduce 
regional 
disparities 
Reduce 
regional 
disparities 
Reduce 
regional 
disparities 
Reduce 
regional 
disparities 
Environmental 
protection 
Environmental 
protection 
Environmental 
protection 
Access to land 
Environmental 
protection 
Access to land 
Environmental 
protection 
Access to land 
HIV/AIDS HIV/AIDS HIV/AIDS HIV/AIDS 
Awareness 
Programmes 
HIV/AIDS 
Looking at the priorities identified above, one is left wondering how the five 
countries came up with such identical interventions-for poverty reduction 
in independent consultations within their own countries. There can be no 
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doubt that with a few exceptions such as privatisation, most of the 
interventions can actually reduce poverty. But then the uniformity of the 
interventions raises the old problem that is always raised in relation to 
SAPs that they are not designed to answer the specific needs of countries 
but rather as a blanket solution for poverty reduction. 
For instance, all the five PRSPs focused on improving primary school 
enrolment as well as the quality of the education at that level. In the five 
countries analysed, the total focus on primary education would have been 
appropriate for Burkina Faso where enrolments are low. In countries such 
as Tanzania and Uganda with higher primary school enrolment, one would 
have expected the focus to perhaps be more on the relevance of tertiary 
education to the job market although some attention could still have been 
paid to primary education. 
The World Bank has in the past argued against focusing on post-primary 
education, largely because of the perceived higher returns from primary 
education, so it is not surprising that the five documents do not go beyond 
this. As Craig and Porter state: "A flick through PRSPs from starkly different 
countries reveals great universality in vocabulary, process, form, content 
and even prescription. This research, therefore, joins others in the critical 
recognition of a globalised one-size-fits-all orientation of PRSPs and related 
programmes." 
In the five PRSPs, policies that have been of concern in relation to SAPs, 
such as user charges are still in evidence although the introduction of free 
primary education in some of the PRSPs offers some relief. In health, 
there is still the argument that it is better to pay for a service than not to 
have one at all. But a critical look at most national governments' budgets 
shows that there are resources being spent in other sectors that could be 
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gainfully used to provide cheaper health services without leaving the poor 
with the option of either paying or not getting services. 
Given this perception of the five PRSPs, it is hardly to be expected that 
there would be a major paradigm shift in the way these countries proposed 
to tackle poverty, especially given that the programme still falls under the 
purview of the same institutions - the World Bank and the IMF. Apart from 
the new focus on social service, rural development and water and 
sanitation, there is therefore very little that is new in the PRSPs of the five 
countries that is not standard IMF and World Bank prescriptions. 
3.3. DIVERGENCES 
Burkina Faso's document explicitly concedes that the PRSP strategy 
seeks to reconcile the requirements of structural reform and economic 
recovery with the objective of increasing the income of the poor and 
transferring more resources to the poorest members of society. The 
emphasis is on promoting equity-based growth. Burkina Faso will also 
aim to benefit from the regional integration process underway in the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union. It is envisaged that swift 
implementation of an ambitious programme of complementary structural 
reforms is required to overcome problems of this landlocked country and 
achieve growth rates permitting a significant alleviation of the incidence of 
poverty. In the case of Uganda, trade openness has been instrumental to 
the achievement of high growth rates. Mozambique is silent about its 
reform policies, concentrating more on social policy. 
In the case of Uganda, sustainable resource is promoted by encouraging 
communal initiatives to protect common property resources. 
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The PRSP for Burkina Faso and Mozambique raise the important issue 
of complementary programmes that would continue parallel to the PRSP 
initiatives. However, whilst it is clear that the PRSPs will seek to utilise 
resources from growth and debt relief, in the case of Burkina Faso, the 
country looks forward to the funding of complementary programmes 
through additional donor resources. This raises a major question about 
sustainability of these interventions. In reality, it could be the furtherance 
of donor dependency 
3.3.1 The Role of the State 
The PRSP is offering an opportunity to redefine the role of government, a 
step that is in tandem with IMF/World Bank policy principles that are aimed 
at limiting government involvement to in areas where the state has a 
comparative advantage (i.e., the provision of public goods). In Burkina 
Faso, redefinition of the role of the State is a key guiding principle of the 
PRSP. In Uganda this policy direction is reflected in the budget whereby 
resource allocation to administration has been reduced to allow re-
allocation towards direct poverty reduction. Uganda's PRSP states that 
the re-allocation towards direct poverty reduction has been achieved by 
focusing on the poverty impact of spending within as well as between 
sectors. Mozambique's PRSP is less explicit on the changing role of the 
State but alludes to the need for the State to be more effective in delivering 
on the options taken and programmes, plans and commitments adopted. 
For instance, on economic growth and poverty, the Uganda PEAP says: 
"Poverty eradicat ion wil l depend on economic growth. Al though 
redistribution would reduce poverty, it would not by any means eliminate 
it. While poverty has many dimensions beyond low incomes, it cannot be 
removed without raising incomes". The PEAP acknowledges that Uganda 
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is an unequal s o c i e t y and says to prevent increased inequality a n d 
maximise growth, the participation of the poor in economic P 0 | i c y 
p r o c e s s e s i s e s s e n t i a l . 
But it will be difficult for the poor to participate in the economy if the growth 
is neutral and there are no redistributive policies. The poor cannot 
participate in the economy because they lack resources, including land 
access to credit, and education or are unemployed. By brushing aside 
redistribution, the document fails to deal with a fundamental problem 
confronting the poor, which is how they can participate in the economy. 
Advocating neutral growth is therefore not likely to reduce poverty. In its 
April 2002 PRSP Progress Report, the government admits that despite 
rapid economic growth since the launch of the PEAP, poverty continues 
to increase in some parts of the country. 
According to the report: "Some indication of widening of income disparities 
after 1997 underscores the critical need for direct action to help poor people 
raise their incomes". The document acknowledges the need for 
redistribution and says: "Government can reach its poverty target of 10% 
by 2017 provided the economy grows by 7% per year and that some 
redistribution takes place. Uganda's economic growth has fallen short of 
this target in the last 2-3 years. This has increased the relative importance 
of redistribution if the 2017 poverty target is to be achieved." This 
underscores the critical importance of pro-poor growth, rather than neutral 
growth and for redistribution as critical strategies for poverty eradication, 
j But it is commonly known that the Bretton Woods institutions do not support 
redistributive policies. 
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3 , 3 . 2 . Squeezing Labour 
f0 increase overall productivity, the Burkina PRSP also proposes to "lower 
the unit labour cost by adjusting the minimum wage and reducing the 
welfare costs borne by formal sector enterprises". As a member of the 
VVest African Economic and Monetary Union, Burkina Faso has a fixed 
exchange rate and cannot adjust the nominal exchange rate to cushion 
the impact of terms of trade shocks. This means that it will therefore 
concentrate on exercising control over factors that determine long-term 
competitiveness, such as labour. In other words, because it cannot devalue 
its currency to keep prices down, the government will suppress wages to 
achieve the same results. The suppression of wages and the reduction of 
welfare costs will have a negative impact on the welfare of workers and 
on poverty reduction without guaranteeing any major foreign investment 
The Burkina Faso government says it will also open up its economy to the 
external sector. But this could be counter productive if this involves 
liberalising the domestic market to imports as the country would be flooded 
with imports to the detriment of its own infant industries. Even the 
agricultural sector could suffer if it allows in agricultural imports from 
regions with highly subsidised agriculture such as the European Union. 
For instance, EU subsidised beef dumped in West Africa posed a serious 
threat to the viability of the cattle industry as local farmers failed to compete 
with the cheaper imported beef. Further opening up the economy is 
therefore not likely to produce positive results for the economy. But again 
this is a prescription of the IMF, World Bank and of late the World Trade 
Organisation. 
On the other hand, the Mauritania PRSP places less emphasis on the 
informal sector of the economy and public sector investment than previous 
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documents have done, concentrating instead on the (formal) private sector 
as the engine of economic growth. 
3.3.3. HIV/AIDS 
Given the high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in the five countries, it is gratifying 
to note that Uganda and Burkina Faso pay significant attention to 
interventions to fight and mitigate the impact of the epidemic. On the other 
hand, it is worrying that Tanzania's response is limited to HIV/AIDS 
awareness programmes. Both Uganda and Burkina Faso propose multi-
sectoral strategies to combat HIV/AIDS. Tanzania would do well to pay 
more attention to the epidemic when it revises its PRSP, as AIDS is 
worsening the poverty crisis in many African countries. 
However, although they pay more attention to HIV/AIDS, both the Ugandan 
and the Burkina Faso PRSPs ignore its gender impacts. The home-based 
care programmes introduced in many countries are placing a heavy burden 
of care on women. This not only affects their own health, but their income 
earning capacity and in the case of girl care-givers can deny them 
education. 
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3.3.4. National Ownership 
In practical terms, ownership means that the government is responsible 
for writing or designing the PRSP and for commissioning and organizing 
technical and donor input into it. Ownership is also extended to 
stakeholders in the economy by consultation of civic society and others. 
There is always tension, however, between developing nationally owned 
strategies and receiving endorsement from the IMF and the World Bank. 
This tension implies that governments would opt to write programmes 
they know would be accepted by the Board of the Fund and the IMF even 
if they conflict with priorities identified through the consultative processes. 
The five PRSPs under review give mixed evidence on the issue of 
ownership. Firstly, they show ownership by the past country development 
plans since they are by and large derived from already existing country 
poverty alleviation action plans. For instance, the PRSP for Mozambique 
is based on prior government plans, including the Lines of Action for the 
Eradication of Absolute Poverty (1999), the PARPA 2000-2004 (Interim 
PRSP), and the Government Programme 200-2004, as well as sectoral 
and inter-sectoral plans, policies and strategies developed by organs of 
the State. 
However, over reliance on existing plans raises questions about the extent 
of ownership by stakeholders outside the State. Ownership by 
stakeholders outside the government (e.g civil society organisations, 
business community and others) will depend on the extent of the 
consultation process governments undertook to prepare the existing plans, 
which form the basis of the present PRSP. Uganda already had well 
developed Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), which guided the 
formulation of government poverty reduction policy since its inception in 
The PRSP for Burkina Faso and Mozambique raise the impou 
of complementary programmes that would continue parallel to the t 
initiatives. However, whilst it is clear that the PRSPs will seek to utilisv 
resources from growth and debt relief, in the case of Burkina Faso, the 
country looks forward to the funding of complementary programmes 
through additional donor resources. This raises a major question about 
sustainability of these interventions. In reality, it could be the furtherance 
of donor dependency 
3.3.1 The Role of the State 
The PRSP is offering an opportunity to redefine the role of government, a 
step that is in tandem with IMF/World Bank policy principles that are aimed 
at limiting government involvement to in areas where the state has a 
comparative advantage (i.e., the provision of public goods). In Burkina 
Faso, redefinition of the role of the State is a key guiding principle of the 
PRSP. In Uganda this policy direction is reflected in the budget whereby 
resource allocation to administration has been reduced to allow re-
allocation towards direct poverty reduction. Uganda's PRSP states that 
the re-allocation towards direct poverty reduction has been achieved by 
focusing on the poverty impact of spending within as well as between 
sectors. Mozambique's PRSP is less explicit on the changing role of the 
State but alludes to the need for the State to be more effective in delivering 
on the options taken and programmes, plans and commitments adopted. 
For instance, on economic growth and poverty, the Uganda PEAP says: 
"Poverty eradicat ion will depend on economic growth. Al though 
redistribution would reduce poverty, it would not by any means eliminate 
it. While D o v e r t v h a s manu Himonc-inno 1 >— 
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documents have done, concentrating instead on the (formal) private sector 
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3.3.4. National Ownership 
In practical terms, ownership means that the government is responsible 
for writing or designing the PRSP and for commissioning and organizing 
technical and donor input into it. Ownership is also extended to 
stakeholders in the economy by consultation of civic society and others. 
There is always tension, however, between developing nationally owned 
strategies and receiving endorsement from the IMF and the World Bank. 
This tension implies that governments would opt to write programmes 
they know would be accepted by the Board of the Fund and the IMF even 
if they conflict with priorities identified through the consultative processes. 
The five PRSPs under review give mixed evidence on the issue of 
ownership. Firstly, they show ownership by the past country development 
plans since they are by and large derived from already existing country 
poverty alleviation action plans. For instance, the PRSP for Mozambique 
is based on prior government plans, including the Lines of Action for the 
Eradication of Absolute Poverty (1999), the PARPA 2000-2004 (Interim 
PRSP), and the Government Programme 200-2004, as well as sectoral 
and inter-sectoral plans, policies and strategies developed by organs of 
the State. 
However, over reliance on existing plans raises questions about the extent 
of ownership by stakeholders outside the State. Ownership by 
stakeholders outside the government (e.g civil society organisations, 
business community and others) will depend on the extent of the 
consultation process governments undertook to prepare the existing plans, 
which form the basis of the present PRSP. Uganda already had well 
developed Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), which guided the 
formulation of government poverty reduction policy since its inception in 
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1997, when the PRSPs preparation process was launched. The country's 
first PRSP therefore extensively relied on the existing plan and further 
consultation during the PRSP was largely to cross check and update the 
plan. True ownership therefore would have to be assessed by looking at 
the extent of participation of civil society and others in the first and final 
stage of the process. 
Uganda, on the other hand, does not link its PRSP with the structural 
adjustment programme or with the HIPC, but rather views it as ' national 
Comprehensive Planning Framework and a strategy to improve the welfare 
of Ugandans and eradicate poverty. 
The extent to which governments view PRSPs only as necessary steps 
to qualify for debt relief to a large extent determines the seriousness with 
which they draft the documents and even involve civil society. There is a 
danger that by making PRSPs conditionality for debt relief, some countries 
end up focusing on the debt relief rather than poverty reduction. 
i 
I 
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4.0. THE LINK BETWEEN PRSPS AND OTHER DEVELOPMENT INI-
TIATIVES 
4.1. PRSPs and NEPAD 
The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is an Africa-wide 
initiative crafted by several of the continent's presidents, including Thabo 
Mbeki of South Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Wade of Senegal 
to tackle Africa's development crisis. NEPAD seeks to marshal international 
investment, trade, debt relief and aid totaling US$64 billion a year to lift 
Africa out of its current economic quagmire. 
Both the NEPAD and PRSPs share similar neo-liberal ideological 
underpinnings, which put a strong emphasis on macroeconomic stability 
as a prerequisite for economic growth. While macroeconomic stability is 
no doubt necessary for sustained economic growth, under structural 
adjustment programmes this has been achieved at great cost to human 
development. To reduce budget deficits, governments have been forced 
to cut down on social expenditures, including on health and education. 
They have also removed subsidies on essential services and on agriculture 
and have had to privatise loss-making parastatals, even where these 
provided services that the private sector could not provide. Macroeconomic 
stability in World Bank/IMF discourse imposes a heavy penalty on the 
poor who find themselves having to pay more for services at a time when 
they can ill afford to do so in the face of declining incomes. 
Like the PRSPs, NEPAD's main attraction for participating countries is 
the prospects of increased aid and like the PRSPs this will come with its 
°wn conditionalities. But because the programme is 'perceived' as 
homegrown it will be difficult for African countries to point fingers at 
developed countries and the multilateral institutions in the event of its failure. 
NEPAD and the PRSPs strive to accelerate the integration of Africa 
(NEPAD) and of individual countries (PRSPs), into the global economy. 
Again, while there can be no doubt about the need for Africa to be integrated 
with the rest of the world, it is the highly unequal terms under which it is 
being integrated that has raised critical questions about the benefits of 
such integration. Through the exploitation of its natural resources by 
developed countries on increasingly unfavourable terms of trade, Africa 
has been integrated into the global economy for longer and more deeply 
than many developed countries. 
Structural adjustment programmes being implemented by African countries 
have also resulted in the rapid integration of the continent, under the trade 
and market liberalisation policies that come with the SAPs. However, the 
integration has not benefited the continent and is not likely to under NEPAD 
or the PRSPs as both do only questions the inequity of global trading 
regimes under bilateral or WTO arrangements but fails to find sustainable 
solutions the current unfair terms of trade. 
Both NEPAD and the PRSPs lay heavy emphasis on privatisation, not 
just of loss making state enterprises but also of essential services such 
as energy, telecommunications and water. In both Burkina Faso and 
Tanzania, privatisation of energy, water reticulation and telecommunications 
is well under way. The privatisation of such public goods raises the moral 
question of how the poor will access these services when they cannot 
pay for them in the absence of legislation that protects their right of access 
to these basic needs. 
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The success of both the PRSPs and NEPAD hinges on high economic 
growth, in the region of 7% per annum. But judging from past experience 
this figure is way too high and unrealistic, which means that the expected 
positive benefits may not materialise if the growth rates cannot be 
achieved. The success of the two initiatives is also on the assumption 
that the countries will be able to attract huge inflows of aid, debt relief and 
foreign direct investment. But to date, the amount of debt relief under HIPC 
has been disturbingly low and in most cases has left countries still with 
unsustainably high debt obligations. 
On the other hand, despite the emergence of democracies in Africa (which 
NEPAD stresses to be a critical pre-requisite for attracting Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), the continent has not been able to attract substantial 
foreign investment. Instead, investment has tended to flow to countries 
with neither democracy nor peace and security. This is particularly true of 
Angola, which because of its abundant oil reserves and diamonds has 
been able to attract more FDI than other more democratic and peaceful 
states in Africa. The high expectations in both the PRSPs and NEPAD of 
FDI inflows as the basis for increased economic growth may therefore be 
unrealistic. 
PRSP and NEPAD look to the external sector as their major source of 
finding at the expense of local efforts for domestic human and capital 
mobilisation. 
Although both the PRSP and NEPAD emphasises civil society participation 
in the process, the PRSP process relatively provides an opportunity for 
civil society involved in the process (a component which is missing in 
NEPAD). 
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The success of both the PRSP and NEPAD in eradicating poverty is far 
fetched for as long as the policy distortions inherent in them remain and 
the lack of genuine participation in the decision making processes by the 
citizenry intensify. 
4.2. Mil lennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
The UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), set minimum targets of 
what developing countries, in partnership with developed countries, should 
aim achieve to alleviate poverty globally by 2015. The goals include the 
following: 
1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
Halve between 1990 and 2015 the proportion of people whose 
income is less than one dollar a day 
Halve between 1990 and 2015 the proportion of people who suffer 
from hunger 
2. Achieve universal primary education 
Ensure that by 201'5, children everywhere, girls and boys alike, 
will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling 
3. Promote gender equality and empower women 
Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, 
preferably by 2005 and to all levels of education, not later than 
2015 
4. Reduce child mortality 
Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five 
mortality rate 
5. Improve maternal health 
Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal 
mortality ratio 
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6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 
• Have halted, and begun to reverse, the spread of HIV/AIDS 
• Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, the incidence of malaria 
and other major diseases 
7. Ensure environmental sustainability 
Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country 
policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental 
resources 
Halve by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access 
to safe drinking water 
By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives 
of at least 100 million slum dwellers. 
8. Develop a global partnership for Development 
The goals of the PRSPs in the five countries are in conformity with the 
Millennium Development Goals, in particular through their priority focus 
on primary education and health as well as on environmental sustainability. 
But issues such as environmental sustainability are a factor of poverty 
levels. The higher the poverty the bigger the threat to the environment as 
people seek to make a living by exploiting the resources at their disposal 
with little regard for sustainability. So to environmental sustainability will 
only be guaranteed to extent that the PRSPs will be successful in reducing 
poverty by creating conditions that allow for sustainable use of the 
resources. 
Looking at these goals, it is easy to realise the extent to which they 
influenced the drafting of PRSPs. The priorities identified by all the countries 
on PRSPs are in line with the MDGs. The PRSPs in the three countries 
focus on primary education, water and sanitation, improved health care 
as well as HIV/AIDS. However, while the rhetoric of the PRSPs is about 
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achieving these goals, the policy framework being promoted is not likely 
to help in their achievement. Thus for instance, the privatisation of water 
and sanitation is likely to deny access to these services to slum dwellers, 
who for the most part share common facilities subsidised by the state 
and who cannot afford to pay market prices. 
Equally, the promotion of export led growth under SAPs as well as under 
PRSPs, where focus has often been on agricultural exports, has resulted 
in environmental degradation as farmers convert marginal lands for 
agricultural purposes. This has often been necessitated by the low prices 
they receive for their crops on the global markets that has forced them to 
increase the area under crops. Environmental sustainability, called for 
under the MDGs, is therefore difficult to achieve given the hostile global 
market for Africa's primary agricultural products. 
But perhaps even more important, the achievement of the MDGs and of 
the targets for poverty reduction set under PRSPs, also require greater 
and more active state involvement, particularly given the levels of poverty 
prevailing on the continent where a greater proportion of the population 
cannot meet the costs of essential services. It is now accepted that 
economic growth does not necessarily lead to poverty reduction unless if 
governments put in policies to achieve greater equity and redistribution. 
But by their heavy reliance on markets, PRSPs are more likely to worsen 
poverty and inequality and make it more difficult to achieve the MDGs. 
NEPAD's architects and its sponsors (western governments and the 
multilateral financial institutions) view the initiative as a major breakthrough 
in achieving the 8th MDG - the development of a global partnership for 
development. From its inception, NEPAD's focus has been on building a 
partnership with developed countries and their financial institutions (at the 
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expense of building a partnership with its own citizens). Unfortunately, 
because of the unequal power relations between the two camps, African 
governments have had to compromise and come up with a document 
that is acceptable to their sponsors and which does not question the status 
quo. Like the PRSPs, NEPAD's heavy reliance on foreign funding meant 
that it could not challenge the inequitable global trading environment, the 
unsustainable foreign debt levels despite the HIPC, the debilitating 
protectionism of northern countries and the primacy of FDI as Africa's 
solution to poverty. 
4.3. Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF): 
The PRSP is also a mechanism for operationalising the World Bank's 
Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF). The CDF is a World 
Bank tool for organising donor, civil society and private sector input into a 
"coherent" development programme. It has been piloted in 13 countries. 
The CDF is mirrored by the United Nations' Development Assistance 
Framework (UNDAF), which also being used in some countries. 
These frameworks apply to countries borrowing from the multilateral 
institutions. Also, the emphasis on sustainable strategies for poverty 
alleviation emanate from the outcome of the Rio+5 follow-up summit to 
the 1992 Earth Summit wherein committed themselves to producing 
National Strategies for Sustainable Development (NSSD) by 2002. 
All these (the CDF, UNDAF and NSSD) are nested frameworks. The 
NSSD is the overarching framework within which sit the CDF and UNDAF, 
whilst the PRSP is a mechanism for operationalising the CDF and UNDAF. 
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5.0. CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN THE PRSP PROCESS 
Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda. 
This section reviews CSO participation in the PRSP process in the five 
countries with completed PRSP. It shows clearly how participation among 
CSO varied tremendously across the countries and brings to the fore the 
different types and forms of participation inherent in the process thereby 
concluding that what many ordinary people might view as participation 
might not be true participation in the real sense. 
5.1. Part icipation 
As noted above, participation determines ownership of processes by people 
within a nation. It is dependent not just on the willingness of states to allow 
space for civil society voices but also on the amount of information to 
which they have access on a continuous basis. Participation can be 
distinguished from other concepts such as 'involvement', 'incorporation' 
or 'consultation' and it may also entail, to a large extent, taking part in 
decision-making processes and being part of the decisions taken. 
The PRSP process in the five countries indicates different levels and forms 
of participation. In Uganda, civil society was involved and consultated at 
every stage and, was complemented by a parallel civil society process 
set up by (mainly international) NGOs. Ugandans were assured that their 
participation had been meaningful when they saw most of their inputs and 
recommendations incorporated into the final PEAP/PRSP report. 
Tanzanians on the other hand see themselves as having been incorporated 
in the PRSP process. They moved from the NPES structure, believed to 
have "strong government ownership and leadership" to the PRSP 
structure, characterised by "foreign influence as the most s i g n i f i c a n t factor" 
5 4 
and government creation of its own civil society to consult with. There 
was inadequate participation of civil society in the PRSP process and 
there is no suggest ion that CSOs expect to be involved in the 
implementation or, monitoring and evaluation stages. 
However, the quality of participation is usually enhanced by other 
contributions besides those of local NGOs and CSOs. Parliament as an 
organ of the state, made up of elected representatives of the people should 
play a critical role. However, when Uganda's Civil Society Task Force 
organised a workshop to introduce members of the Ugandan Parliament 
to the PEAR/PRSP process, less than twenty of the 276 Members of 
Parliament attended. On a more positive note, the Uganda report notes 
the incorporation of findings from local research institutions into the PEAP/ 
PRSP, stating that, "Such inputs widened the scope and definition of poverty 
and broadened the ownership of the PEAP." 
Just as poverty reduction strategies are ongoing, so participation needs 
also to be ensured into the future. The extent to which this occurs, however, 
is likely to be a function of the level and quality of participation in the planning 
stages. Thus, in Uganda, where there was quite some satisfaction with 
the amount of civil society's participation in the formulation of the PRSP, 
Government has also made a commitment to make known all relevant 
information about public policies, budgetary policies and public expenditure. 
The Uganda Debt Network has already become involved in monitoring the 
Poverty Action Fund, a government mechanism for mobilisation of the 
savings from debt relief in priority areas for poverty alleviation. 
While the Mauritanian process took place much more firmly under 
government structures, there was some level of civil society involvement 
at some stage and more recently in the follow up processes. Mauritania 
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is the only country that mentions launching its PRSP process with 
awareness campaign i.e. a downward flow of information to civil society 
to facilitate its involvement. Aside from this, Uganda is the only other 
country that mentions use of the media. Its Civil Society Task Force 
organised a media campaign around radio and television phone-in 
programmes in which government officials were invited to respond to 
queries from the public and to explain the PRSP process. Use of a phone-
in format allows for flow of information and issues both ways within a 
single programme. The Task Force also used the print media to publicise 
the process and invite contributions from the public. 
In Mozambique, civil society tended to be sidelined both ways in that the 
space for civil society engagement was not very clear. However, they made 
good use of both traditional publicity materials, such as printed information 
packages, and a website. However, the report also identifies challenges 
in information dissemination, one of which is the need to use local 
languages. 
Beyond the flow of information between policy makers and civil society, 
McCarthy, in his assessment of the Mozambican PRSP process 
recommends information sharing between CSOs as a means of collective 
strengthening. The Tanzanian study lists the following four types of civil 
society organisations: 
1 Service delivery organisations; 
2 Policy analysis, advocacy and lobbying organisations; 
3 Research organisations; and 
4 Legal aid and human rights organisations. 
Of these four, the last three were involved on some level in the production 
and dissemination of information. Civil society, therefore, has valuable 
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experience to share in this regard. 
5.2. Accountabi l i ty 
In a PRSP context, accountability means: 
ensuring that the process of drawing up the PRSP 
explicitly reflects the needs and priorities of the poor; 
establishing realistic mechanisms so that people can 
hold government and service providers answerable for 
the delivery of policies and goods, and for the spending 
of public funds; 
involving citizens directly in monitoring how PRSP 
strategies are being implemented, and whether anti-
poverty commitments are being fulfilled.3 
As mentioned earlier, the involvement of civil society in monitoring the 
PRSP process tends to be similar to their level of involvement in the original 
planning stages. Uganda civil society, as compared to the other four 
countries, had the greatest opportunities and capcities for participation. 
They also seem to be most satisfied that they would be involved in the 
monitoring stages of the PRSP and other macroeconomic policy 
processes. 
In Tanzania, a lack of accountability on the part of the donors, and sponsors 
of the PRSP has been identified, arising from the incapacity and lack of 
opportunity for civil society in that country to be involved. Where "donors 
have...gone ahead to take care of their own interests in their lending 
mechanisms, it is suggested that the PRSP becomes a "dormant paper", 
as noted by a Tanzanian participant to a Validation Meeting on PRSP held 
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in Harare Zimbabwe, 2002. 
The level of involvement of civil society in the formulation of PRSPs seems 
to be a function of: 
The experience and preparedness of local NGOs, CSOs and individual 
members of civil society; and 
The willingness of governments to consult and take civil society views 
into account. 
5.3. Civil Society Preparedness and Key issues addressed 
Civil society groups in Burkina Faso recognise the efforts of Government 
in getting the PRSP process together. The process was conducted in 
three stages, being information dissemination and sensitisation exercises, 
regional workshops, and nationals workshops. 
The experience of Burkina Faso detailed the participation of all groups 
(civil society, local and central administration, development partners, 
political parties, private sector) in the process towards the formulation of 
the country's PRSP and the level of their input. It was noted that CSOs in 
Burkina Faso were not very strong but some put themselves out to take 
part in the PRSP process. Within the overall figures for civil society 
participation, women's representation in the workshops was generally low, 
with only one out of seventeen civil society representatives in the 
Ouagadougou workshop being female. However, in one of the regional 
workshops, although only three or four women were officially invited from 
civil society, seven turned up and stayed to ensure that their voices were 
heard. In fact the quota for civil society participation in most of the 
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workshops and meetings was exceeded. 
Though there was some level of satisfaction with the actual presence of 
civil society representatives, further analysis of the level of input of various 
participants noted that only only a few participants usually dominated formal 
and informal contributions to the meetings. 
Civil society participation could have been strengthened by better quality 
representation. As noted, the government chose which sections of civil 
society it wanted to deal with. Sometimes, those invited were not the most 
knowledgeable on the subjects being discussed. This problem was 
exacerbated by the fact that the workshops each concentrated on particular 
themes. 
For Tanzania, CSOs had some experience in policy formulation, having 
participated in the processes towards the Tanzania Assistance Strategy 
Paper, Vision 2025 and the National Poverty Eradication Strategy. 
Therefore, the question is not whether CSOs were involved in the PRSP 
process but whether their involvement had any measurable significance 
in terms of inputs towards influencing the process and content of these 
policy documents. 
However, the participation of civil society in the PRSP process generally 
was typical of their participation in most government led processes i.e. 
they were not officially kept in the picture and, therefore, had to initiate 
their own parallel processes. This they did, under the leadership of the 
Tanzania Coalition for Debt and Development (TCDD), developing a 
position paper on both the process and contents of the PRSP as well as 
continuing to lobby Government to open up to civil society perspectives. 
They succeeded in creating an opportunity for them to present this 
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document within the context of the government process at a later date. 
In terms of the issues addressed, some discussions were on poverty 
citing the linkages between the different manifestations of poverty. The 
'poor' in Tanzania were described as being any or all of the following: 
illiterate; with inadequate safe water supply; experiencing poor health 
services; belonging to the high mortality rate group; experiencing 
malnutrition; experiencing environmental degradation; unemployed; 
belonging to the low income bracket; and/or homeless. This situation of 
poverty in Tanzania is pervasive and deep rooted. 
Somewhat, the notion of poverty based on an appreciation of cultural 
diversity, suggest ing that this would introduce similarly diverse 
interpretations of poverty and approaches to dealing with it, would be more 
appropriate than the "uni-modal" way of thinking (as generally exemplified 
by the Bretton Woods Institutions). 
Other issues discussed in the Zonal workshops included: access to basic 
education, marketing systems for agricultural produce, unavailability of 
inputs and implements, inadequate extension services, access to basic 
health care, poor condition of rural roads and, access to safe water and 
sanitation. 
In Uganda, the government took a decision to involve civil society in the 
PRSP process following unyielding pressure from CSOs. They were able 
to apply this pressure on the basis of past experience in previous processes 
dating back to 1996, during time of the Structural Adjustment Participatory 
Review Initiative (SAPRI) and the World Bank's Country Assistance 
Strategy (CAS), as well as government sponsored national initiatives. Their 
proactive approach had earned them the right to participate in the annual 
00 
Consultative Group meetings held in Uganda. They were thus well prepared 
to take the opportunity for participation in the PRSP. 
They also participated both within the government framework for 
formulation of the PRSP and, where they felt it necessary, outside this 
process as well. Participation in the formal process was through a 
government initiated Civil Society Task Force, composed of international 
and national NGOs operating in Uganda, with the Uganda Debt Network 
becoming the lead Agency for civil society participation. The Task Force 
became engaged in the reformulation of the PEAP into the PRSP. This 
Task Force also formed part of the Steering Committee that drove the 
whole process. 
Specific activit ies of the Task Force were: 
Running consultations with grassroots groups as a complementary 
initiative to a series of workshops with local government officials run 
by Government; 
A media campaign to disseminate information on the PRSP process 
and collect views from a wide cross section of society; and 
Consultations with special interest groups, such as those involved in 
conflict resolution and environmental issues, and other CSOs, such 
as the National Union of Trade Unions. 
Further civil society initiatives took place outside the activities of the Task 
Force and drew in contributions from over 200 other NGOs and community 
based organisations. During consultations, civil society groups brought 
forward issues of unemployment, which might otherwise have been 
considered a low priority. They viewed employment creation as a priority 
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concern along with mechanisms for civil society participation in monitoring 
of the PRSP programme. These issues were presented to the Technical 
(drafting) Committee, which incorporated them into the PEAP/PRSP, and 
also including the whole section on participation and monitoring which 
was also written by civil society. 
The consultation process towards the formulation of the PRSP in 
Mozambique used participatory methodologies, thus attempting to draw 
out the views of civil society. However, a distinction was made between 
the 'private sector' and other 'civil society' groups, noting that the private 
sector, rather than civil society, dominated the later rounds of consultations 
due to the fact that they were better organised and had initiated their own 
series of meetings with the Ministry of Planning and Finance. Grupo 
Mogambicano da Divida, the Mozambique Debt Group, a Debt Coalition, 
which has been active around issues of debt relief/cancellation, also took 
the initiative to organise two meetings but the most of these meetings 
were held too late for the output to be considered in the PRSP document. 
In terms of issues addressed, the Mozambican PRSP process included 
construction of a matrix of factors of poverty which allowed planners to 
begin prioritising the many issues and working towards solutions. In terms 
of responses, the civil society in Mozambique focused on sectoral issues. 
For instance, Agriculture, outlining the many faceted response that would 
be appropriate in that sector which would include access to credit, a policy 
for joint local development by local and national partners, warehouses for 
food and commercial products, an agro- industrial policy, compensation 
funds and a legal framework for new partnerships between family and 
commercial enterprises. 
As noted earlier, the issues raised were put into a matrix in order to establish 
priorities. Priority issues were found to be investment in national human 
6 2 
resources, employment and self employment, access to credit, 
infrastructure and basic services, promotion of agro industry, protection 
of national industries, governance and the fight against corruption, 
bureaucracy, and decentralisation. 
The NGO sector in Mauritania is small and relatively underdeveloped. 
However, there is a national network of NGOs, which was able to 
consolidate civil society strength and capacities and became the main 
facilitator of civil society participation in Mauritania's PRSP process. The 
major issues of concern to civil society were support to the informal sector 
and commodity pricing. 
Given the complexity of the processes and poverty situation in all the five 
countries, it is suggested that monitoring of poverty alleviation strategies 
needs to be based on both qualitative and quantitative approaches, with 
qualitative studies involving government research and study groups, 
academic institutions and other civil society organisations. 
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5.4. Government A t t i tude towards Civ i l Soc ie ty Organisat ions 
(CSOs) 
In Burkina Faso, there were frequent complaints from civil society 
representatives that they were unable to participate effectively because 
they were not advised of meetings or did not receive the appropriate terms 
of reference in time. This led to a fairly low number of formal (written) 
contributions from civil society. A representative of an opposition political 
party maked the same complaint. Lack of translation facilities at the 
meetings also limited civil society participation. 
While civil society in Mauritania is said to have been involved in policy 
processes in the past, the process under PRSP was more open and 
CSOs felt that their involvement had been more real than has been the 
case previously and that it had been at every stage from early preparations 
through to the evaluation. However, the Government of Mauritania has 
recently put in place an institutional device to monitor development partners, 
civil society and donors. 
McCarthy's assessment of the PRSP process in Mozambique points to a 
lacklustre attitude on the part of the Mozambican government, noting that 
the recovery from "a generation or more of paternalistic socialism" has 
not been completed and this has kept civil society in a state of "infancy". 
He further suggests that the government "conducted the consultation 
process as a requirement for debt relief rather than as an end in itself'. 
The consultations, anyway, were very limited in their geographical scope 
and Government was unwilling to hold meetings in areas under opposition 
party control. Another study4 suggests problems with even deciding on a 
consultation process that would satisfy PRSP requirements or gathering 
the energy to go back through the (inconsistent) process it had already 
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conducted in the formulation of PARPA. 
Civil society argues that they should have been given the opportunity to fill 
these gaps. The picture created from data collected mainly around Maputo, 
and only in Portuguese, is distorted and could actually exacerbate existing 
problems. Enhanced participation of CSOs would have had the potential 
to draw in regional and rural perspectives. 
Since the completion of the PARPA/PRSP there have been some attempts 
to improve the quality of future consultations, viz. 
NGOs, under the Mozambique Debt group held a two day seminar 
that brought together 75 participants from NGOs, Parliament, 
Government, the international financial institutions, the Central Bank 
of Mozambique and the press; and 
Government has put forward its consultation initiatives for 2002 and 
worked on a model for future consultations to ensure appropriation 
of public policy by civil society. Both the civil society and government 
initiatives reflect the fact that the PARPA/PRSP in Mozambique is 
regarded as a "rolling plan" and it is expected that there will be 
continuos consultations, revision and updating. 
In another development, the PRSP institutional framework for participation 
takes the sector approach, a matter, which civil society and the private 
sector had highly criticised as a major impediment to their participation. 
This framework allows for participation through government line ministries 
in which there is no clear mechanisms for taking on board civil society 
recommendations. 
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In Tanzania, many of the civil society actors feel "cheated" by both the 
government and the donors, especially the World Bank. The official PRSP 
process in Tanzania was entirely Government led with only cosmetic 
attempts to involve civil society and induce them to approve drafts prepared 
in advance by the Technical Committee. Even the Zonal Workshops, which 
were purportedly aimed at soliciting views from the grassroots, involved 
only 804 participants across the whole country and some of these were 
government employees (District Executive Directors). Though women 
make up the majority of the poor, only 22 percent of all participants were 
female. Following the Zonal Workshops, a draft PRSP was prepared but 
this was not brought back to civil society, even for 'rubber stamping'. 
This is seen to be fairly typical of government-civil society relations in 
Tanzania but the fact that the World Bank, being aware of inadequacies in 
the process used, went ahead and accepted Tanzania's PRSP, is the 
cause of civil society's frustration with donors. 
The civil society in Uganda noted that government's commitment to the 
consultations in that country was an essential factor. Government facilitated 
a consultation process in which civil society was meaningfully involved; 
provided CSOs with necessary information, including the draft PEAP/PRSP, 
ensured that a substantial amount of the output of the consultation process 
was included in the final document; and made CSOs full members of the 
National Task Force so that they were able to attend all meetings. This 
approach is identified as a very important milestone in changing 
government-civil society relationships in Africa. 
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5.5. CSO Constraints 
Capacity 
By definition, the countries undertaking PRSPs are both heavily indebted 
and poor. It is, therefore, inevitable that they will be severely constrained in 
their capacity to carry out a comprehensive, participatory consultation 
exercise with all the requirements in terms of personnel/expertise, 
transport, communications, documentation and so on that this entails. 
Although civil society, if called on to do so, can add on to government 
efforts, it is also true that (at least national) CSOs and NGOs in a poor 
country are unlikely to be very well resourced either. 
The civil society in Mauritania called for investment around the PRSP 
process itself as a means of carrying out not only the consultation process 
but also the poverty reduction efforts that are supposed to follow. Mauritania 
is a country that finds itself in an unstable economic situation with markets 
for its two leading products, iron and fish, threatened and concedes that it 
will need substantial financial and capacity building assistance to 
simultaneously meet the objectives of economic growth and poverty 
reduction. 
In Mozambique, a number of civil society organisational factors hampered 
their making a meaningful input. These included a lack of documentation, 
particularly documents translated into local languages, and infrastructural 
factors such as Mozambique's poor communications and poor road 
network. 
CSOs in Uganda acknowledge that they had their own capacity constraints 
including insufficient staff, at either national or local level, qualified to engage 
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donors and policy makers in dialogue on macroeconomic policy issues. 
However, they felt that they had much to gain by taking the opportunity 
offered to participate in the PRSP. 
Tanzanian CSOs feel that they had the capacity to play a similar role in 
their country's PRSP but were not given the opportunity. The Tanzania 
study finds that "the final PRSP document does not demonstrate the civil 
society perspective and inputs in any meaningful way". Thus, the Tanzanian 
government missed what may have been its best chance to add value to 
its own efforts to meet the requirements of the PRSP (although the whole 
process is undermined by the fact that the World Bank accepted the 
strategy as presented anyway). 
Time 
Debt relief is, of course, a very attractive prospect to a country that is 
heavily indebted and trying to overcome problems of poverty. From the 
five countries under study, Mauritania stands to have its debt reduced by 
50 percent and Tanzania by 54 percent (over twenty years). The desire to 
get the PRSP completed so that debt relief can be applied inevitably 
creates time pressures that are likely to undermine the quality of the 
process itself. As noted in the countries, the PRSPs were developed in 
conditions marked by financial, infrastructural and other capacity 
constraints anyway. The imposition of, sometimes-severe time constraints 
on this situation can only make matters worse. 
In every case, the pressure was on for the PRSP to be completed as 
quickly as possible although in the case of Mauritania, a long delay between 
their being accorded HIPC status and the launching of the PRSP process 
derailed the process. 
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Participatory approaches are, by their very nature, long winded as well as 
expensive. In Burkina Faso, it was found that the prevailing situation did 
not allow for a truly participatory approach and there was insufficient time 
to reconcile the findings from civil society consultations with those from 
other sources. 
Time constraints in Mozambique meant that many potentially valuable 
inputs did not make it into the PRSP. By the time that civil society groups 
came to the realisation that the consultation process was not going to be 
adequate and began organising their own parallel series of meetings, it 
was already too late. The first of the two civil society meetings did feed 
into the PRSP but those who were only able to attend the second meeting, 
after the PRSP had already been finalised, did not have an input. This 
included academics working on gender and land tenure issues. It is evident 
that the consultations in Mozambique were not enough and broad enough. 
Tanzania spent ten months on the preparation of its PRSP. Although this 
might not be a long time, the problem is the fact that of this period, only 
two days were devoted to consultations that had any civil society 
participation on grounds that emerging democracies tend to have weak 
civil societies that are unable to offer effective support to policy processes. 
However, one could as easily argue the opposite, that the weakness of 
civil society is the rationale for allowing more time for such processes to 
be completed meaningfully. 
Of the five countries, Uganda came under the most pressure to complete 
its PRSP urgently. As in the other countries, there was great internal urgency 
to qualify for debt relief but this was compounded by external pressure 
from donors who needed a successful example of a country benefiting 
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from the enhanced HIPC initiative to show off at the spring meetings of 
the Bretton Woods institutions in 2000. As a result, the PEAP process, in 
which civil society had been meaningfully involved, became constricted 
into a six month PRSP process from which they found themselves, to 
some extent, squeezed out. The few meetings that took place between 
the IMF/World Bank missions and CSOs were almost like verification 
meetings to find out the level of civil society participation and the quality of 
inputs. The subtext to this is that, had CSOs indicated that their level of 
participation had not been satisfactory, they would have jeopardised their 
country's qualification for much needed debt relief. 
TO 
6.0. BEST PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNT 
Mauritania launched its PRSP process with an awareness campaign 
so that civil society were aware that the PRSP existed, knew what it 
was all about and was, therefore, prepared to participate in its 
formulation. 
Ugandan CSOs organised a campaign using print and electronic 
media to enhance the two-way flow of information around the PRSP. 
Both Mauritania and Uganda tried to ensure the involvement of 
Parliament. This was not very successful in the case of Uganda 
but, in Mauritania, it was found to reinforce both the PRSP and other 
policy, which it needed to be coherent with. 
Uganda also involved local research institutions, thus recognising and 
strengthening the multi layered nature of civil society and enriching 
the PRSP through contributions from all levels. 
Civil society organisations in Tanzania, Mozambique and Uganda set 
up parallel consultation processes to those being conducted by their 
governments. It should be noted that the success of these processes 
depended so much on the amount of (at least moral) support they 
received from government. 
The Ugandan government considered civil society as a serious 
stakeholder in the PRSP and deliberately encouraged its participation. 
It backed up this belief by facilitating CSO participation through the 
inclusion of the Civil Society Task Force in the Steering Committee 
for the PRSP process. In addition, it ensured that CSOs had access 
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to necessary documentation and information. 
Some civil society inputs were wholly incorporated into the PRSP in 
Uganda, thus strengthening the strategy itself and satisfying 
members of civil society that they did own the document. 
Mozambique and Uganda built into their PRSPs, and their nationally 
conceived strategies, mechanisms for continuing civil society involvement 
in revision and, evaluation and monitoring of the strategies. 
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